Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
Undergraduate Honors Capstone Projects

Honors Program

5-1989

Reeducation in the American Zone: The Quest for Democracy in
Post-War Germany
Lael D. Sharp
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honors
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Sharp, Lael D., "Reeducation in the American Zone: The Quest for Democracy in Post-War Germany"
(1989). Undergraduate Honors Capstone Projects. 341.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/honors/341

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
the Honors Program at DigitalCommons@USU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu.

Reeducation in the American Zone:
The Quest For Democracy in Post-War Germany

by

LaelD.Sharp

HonorsSeniorThesis
Spring Quarter, 1989

"'There is an embarrassment ... about trying to force people to have
freedom."' 1 This statement, given in 19'43 by Stringfellow Barr, a member of
the General Advisory Committe on Reeducation for the State Department,
proved to be prophetic for the reeducation and denazification efforts of the
United States in post-war Germany. Faced with a lack of consensus about
policy goats, a severe shortage of resources, a scarcity of qualified Germans
untainted by National Socialism, and a decimated educational infrastructure,
the direct results of reeducation were predestined to be meager. However, if
democracy was to take root and flourish in Germany this time around, these
efforts were critical. Experience had shown that the mere establishment of
the outward forms of democratic government was worthless -- what was
needed was an inner spirit to give them meaning. This was the task of
reeducation.
The first battle to be faced in creating a reeducation policy for Germany
was to resolve the ongoing conflict over the fundamental purpose of the
Occupation. Due to intense rivalry between the various branches of
government (and Roosevelt's increasing inability to impose order as his illness
progressed), "the Washington bureaucratic maze in World War II was not
conducive to developing consistent or logical plans for the Occupation, and all
face ts of national policy, including the notion of reeducation, suffered
accordingly."2 The main struggle was between those who favored
rehabilitation, including most State Department officials, and those who
advocated punitive measures, for whom Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau, Jr. was the most prominent spokesman. From the beginning this
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conflictwas embeddedin the very heartof the policydirectivesissuedfor the
governing of Occupied Germany. According to JCS 1067, issued in April of
1945, the basic objective of Military Government was
to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the
peace of the world. Essential steps in the accomplishment of this
objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their
forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals for
punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of
Germany, with continuing control over Germany's capacity to
make war, and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of
German political life on a democratic basis. 3
Thus, while immediate attention was focused on negative measures
such as denazification, demilitarization, and deindustrialization, the ultimate
goal was democratization. On the whole, however, JCS 1067 reflected the
desire of the Morgenthau clique to ensure the pastoralization of Germany and
its inability to ever wage war again. Examples of these provisions include
directives that "no action will be taken in execution of the reparations
program or otherwise which would tend to support living conditions in
Germany or in your zone on a higher level than that existing in any one of the
neighboring United Nations,"4 or, even more bluntly, that "you will take no
steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b)
designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy."5
However, as the importance of Germany for Europe's economic recovery
became evident, it was recognized that the philosophy behind Morgenthau·s
proposals was one of revenge rather than practicality. 6 His influence, although
still considerable, waned steadily, and his dismissal under Truman cleared the
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way for a more reconstructionist approach. From then on, the obstacles had
more to do with resources than policy.
These obstacles could be severe. In May of 1945, there were only ten
education officers in the Control Council to administer the critical operations of
denazifying and reviving a zonal educational system for nearly twenty million
people.7 That this was a severe underallocation of resources, especially in
light of the importance that was placed on reeducation and denazification, is
clear . In December of 1945 a report was issued that wryly remarked that "the
best that could be said for the American effort to date was that its ongoing
'shortage of staff .. . contributed indirectly to a further development of local
German enterprise ."'8
This was compounded by (and partially a result of) the low status held
by Education and Religious Affairs , which was in charge of these operations. It
remained a "mere section " until January of 1946, when it became a branch,
but it was not until March of 1948 that it became a full division. 9 Lacking a
prominent spokesperson in either the Military Government or in Washington ,
E&RAfaced a continual shortage of manpower and funds. It is true, however,
that this was the case throughout the military bureaucracy and General Lucius
Clay, the regional commander, wisely realized that priority went to alleviating
the massive malnutrition which threatened the German people.
There was one area in which policy proved to be more of an obstacle
than resources , and that was denazification. "Denazification proved to be a
,

source of unending dissatisfaction in Military Government. All Occupation
personnel supported it in principle as indispensible to the creation of a
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healthiersociety.It wasthe precondition
to the positiveprogramsdesiredby
the reconstructionists. Yet, in practice, denazification proved impossible to
execute with the limited Military Government resources on hand." 18 The
problem was especially acute in education. It was recognized in SWNCC
269/5, the Long-Range Policy Statement on German Reeducation prepared by
the State Department, that for both practical and ideological considerations
any effective reform of education must come from the Germans themselves;
there were nowhere near enough E&RApersonnel to supervise)much less
conductJinstruction, and participation by the Germans was crucial for lasting
results. 11 However, all male and most female teachers had been required to
join the Nazi Party, and even if they had only been "nominal participants" in
National Socialism, they could still be forbidden "to be active as a teacher,
preacher, editor, author, or radio commentator.'' 12
Whether or not they would actually be banned depended upon a
number of factors, but often the most prominent was the state of public
opinion back in the United States. The degree of rigor to which denazification
was carried out was in a state of constant flux, "depending on which pressure
Military Government felt most keenly at the moment: the desire to preserve
trained personnel or the fear of criticism by the American public.''13 On the
one hand was the basic policy of denazification, proclaimed by the Potsdam
agreement as one the the fundamental purposes by which the Four-Power
Control Councilwould be guided, and on the other was the need for trained
and competent German leaders to supply the immediate hands-on direction
the Military Government simply did not have the resources to provide.
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However, the total pervasiveness of National Socialism was such that it was
usually impossible to find sufficient staff who were totally uncompromised.
In October of 1945, after some particularly stinging press criticism of
allegedly lax denazification efforts, a new law, Military Government Directive
No. 8, encouraged the consideration of cases under the most stringent terms
possible. People were banned from holding any post, in government or
industry, for any sort of connection with National Socialism, whether active or
nominal; while this was not strictly required by the letter of the law, the
political environment was such that most officials would have rather been
accused of being overzealous than of coddling Nazis. Under this law, 70 to 90
percent of all teachers were dismissed by November of 1947. 14 Obviously,
this had a serious impact on the ability of the Education and Religious Affairs
Bra.nch to carry out school reopenings.
The scope of the denazification program soon grew to the point where
Military Government could not handle it all. Some thirteen million
Fr11ge/Jogen(questionnaires on political activities before and during the Nazi

regime) were returned to headquarters, where each was to be carefully
investigated and the appropriate action taken. 15 Three measures were taken
to attempt to attack the growing piles of Fr11ge/Jogen which began piling up
in hallways, closets, and cellers: First, an amnesty was granted to those born
after January 1, 1919, unless they could be classified as Major Offenders or
Offenders; 16 a second to those whose incomes had been less than 3,600 Reichs
Marks during the Nazi regime and "who therefore were not regarded as the
beneficiaries of the vast looting of German industry undertaken by Goering
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and otherNazileaders;"and a third to the disabled.Thesethree actionscut
down the size of the problem immensely, but some two million active cases
remained to be processed. 17
Thus, the denazification corps was forced to resort to the same
expedient as every other Military Government agency; they began to employ
the Germans themselves to rule on denazification cases. This was authorized
by the Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism of 5
March 1946 (German Law 104), in which the Military Government
magnanimously declared it had "decided that the German people may share
the responsibility for liberation from National Socialism and Militarism in all
fields." 18 Problems cropped up almost immediately. In contrast to Military
Government Law No. 8, German Law 104 approached denazification as a
process of rehabilitation rather than a purge, with the results that after five
months the German tribunals had examined 583,985 cases and dismissed
530,907 of them without trial. Out of the two million active cases, only
930,000 were ever brought to trial and only 1,549 were found guilty as major
offenders. 19
If the experience of the Military Government and the later German
civilian tribunals offered any concrete lesimns, it was that the truth was
extremely hard to discover. Personal testimony was notoriously unreliable.
"After a few months of experience, most investigators and Military
Government personnel grew wary of accusations and statements by
individuals. After twelve years of political repression, followed by def eat,
there were too many old scores to settle:· 20 The German people soon grew
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alienated with a system they viewed as capricious and harsh. A 1945
telegram to the Secretary of State summarized local reaction admirably:
intelligence reports constantly suggest that while all non-Nazi
Germans welcome our denazification policy, they are often critical
of its application. They feel it is too 'schematic' and too rigid with
insufficient provision for making numerous exceptions to the
general rules. Germans usually feel that many persons who were
only nominal Nazis are falling under the axe unjustly and that
some active Nazis are being missed . . . There is apparently no
agreement among Germans as to how far the denazification
program should be carried. Two things seem chiefly to irritate
them: What appears to their uncritical eyes to be mass
discharges and penalties applied to all Party members regardless
of individual merits of the case, and the unavoidable lack of
uniformity in the application of the denazification policy in
different localities.21
Many Americans had the same criticisms.
In addition to the havoc caused by the denazification purges, E&RAhad
to contend with the physical devastation caused by the war and the lack of
politically acceptable textbooks. In Bavaria, "virtually all the school buildings
that had escaped destruction were now [May 1945] in use as billets, military
hospitals, or displaced-persons camps."22 Elsewhere in the American Zone the
situation was similar. The universities were particularly hard hit; the
University of Munich required six months of heavy labor at reconstruction
work before a student could begin studies. 23
The search for textbooks not thoroughly infused with Nazi ideology and
militaristic nationalism posed even greater obstacles. None of the texts used
during the Nazizeit could possible be used, and books from the Weimar
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Republicwereno longerto be found. Finally,in desperation,microfilmed
copies of pre-Hitler te1tbooks were shipped over from the collection at
Columbia Teachers College.24 Even these were far from ideal, as they tended
to glorify nationalism and military conquest; however, it was felt that to
censor them would make the Germans feel they were being handed Allied
propaganda, so a disclaimer was inserted into each of these "emergency
textbooks:"
This textbook is one of a series which is being published by order
of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force for
emergency use in German schools in the area occupied by his
forces. It has been selected after a thorough examination of
many of the books in use in Germany before the Nazi accession to
power. It is a textbook of German authorship and has been
reprinted without textual alteration. Its issue does not imply that
it is entirely suitable from an educational point of view or
otherwise . It is merely the best book which could be found in the
circumstances and must serve until Germany produces better
textbooks of its own.25
Unfortunately , this was not to occur for some time ; locally produced textbooks
were not to appear until 1947, and even then the amounts were severely
limited due to paper shortages .26
Thus, the problems seemed to overwhelm even the most dedicated
efforts at E&RA. All in all, the record of reeducation in post-war Germany is
mixed; heroic efforts were intermingled with excessive interference and
under allocation of resources to produce results not wholly satisfactory to
anyone. The ultimate significance of the reeducation effort, however, may be
much greater than the meager list of Occupation achievements might indicate;
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the presence of a strong democratic nation forty years afterwards gives good
prima facie evidence of lasting accomplishment. In any case, the attempt

was inevitable. "[The Americans) had chosen not to eliminate the German
people or to garrison the country permanently -- actions that would have
been morally and practically impossible. It followed, therefore, that the
United States must seek to change 'the mentality of the German people to the
end that Germany ... [may) eventually be permitted to live without
surveillance and control."27 In this, at least, the Americans appear to have
succeeded.
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